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Abstract
We initiate the study of bribery problem in the con-
text of gerrymandering and reverse gerrymander-
ing. In our most general problem, the input is a set
of voters having votes over a set of alternatives, a
graph on the voters, a partition of voters into con-
nected districts, cost of every voter for changing her
district, a budget for the briber, and a favorite alter-
native of the briber. The briber needs to compute
if the given partition can be modified so that (i)
the favorite alternative of the briber wins the re-
sulting election, (ii) the modification is budget fea-
sible, and (iii) every new district is connected. We
study four natural variants of the above problem
– the graph on voter being arbitrary vs complete
graph (corresponds to removing connectedness re-
quirement for districts) and the cost of bribing every
voter being uniform vs non-uniform. We show that
all the four problems are NP-complete even under
quite restrictive scenarios. Hence our results show
that district based elections are quite resistant un-
der this new kind of electoral attack. We comple-
ment our hardness results with polynomial time al-
gorithms in some other cases.
Introduction
A fundamental problem in multiagent systems
is to aggregate preferences of a set of agents
into a societal preference. Voting has served
as one of the most important tool for this
aggregation task in various applications (see
for example (Pennock, Horvitz, and Giles 2000;
Chakraborty et al. 2019)). We assume that agents
or voters express their preferences as a complete
ranking over some set of alternatives. The plurality
voting protocol is arguably the simplest and most
widely used voting system where the winners are
the set of alternatives who is the most preferred al-
ternative of a maximum number of voters. In this
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paper we focus on district based election system.
In such system, the voters are partitioned into dis-
tricts. The winner of the election is the alternative
which wins in the maximum number of districts. In-
deed many real world election systems follow this
model: the electoral college in US presidential elec-
tions, Indian political election, etc. are important
examples of use of district based elections in prac-
tice.
However, a typical voting system can come un-
der various kind of election control attacks — a set
of agents, either internal (e.g. voters) or external
(e.g. briber), may be able to successfully swing
the outcome of the election in their favor. We refer
to (Faliszewski and Rothe 2016) for an overview
of common control attacks on voting systems.
Bartholdi et al. (Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick 1989)
initiated the study of computational complex-
ity of various election control problems and
since then it has been one of the major re-
search focus in computational social choice (see
(Conitzer and Walsh 2016, and references therein)
for example). Bartholdi et al. and Hemaspaandra et
al. (Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe 2007)
studied computational complexity of an important
control problem namely ”Control by Partitioning
Voters into Two Districts.” This fundamental prob-
lem has recently been generalized along with
two dimensions — (i) the number of districts
can be any integer k which is given as input, (ii)
there is a graph on the set of voters and every
district required to be a connected subgraph
of this graph. This problem is called gerryman-
dering (Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein 2017;
Cohen-Zemach, Lewenberg, and Rosenschein 2018).
Indeed there have been serious allegations
that some political parties in US effectively
manipulated some elections in their fa-
vor through gerrymandering (Erikson 1972;
Issacharoff 2002).
Lev and Lewenberg observed that, although dis-
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Figure 1: Summary of results and complexity theoretic relationship among problems studied in paper. For
two problems X and Y, we right X → Y to denote that problem Y many-to-one reduces to problem X in
polynomial time.
tricts being connected is a fundamental require-
ment for various district based election scenar-
ios like political election, in some other appli-
cations, we may get rid of connectedness re-
quirement (Lev and Lewenberg 2019). Examples
of such applications include election within an or-
ganization, election performed over an online plat-
form, etc. Lev and Lewenberg called this problem
reverse gerrymandering.
Motivation
All the existing work on election control by voter
partition and gerrymandering study the problem of
designing a partition from scratch — the input is
a set of voters and one needs to find a partition
favoring some alternative. However, in typical ap-
plications of this type of election control, district
based political election for example, there already
exists a partition of voters into districts and it may
not be feasible for someone, let us call her a briber,
to change the existing partition too much. In par-
ticular, even if there exists a partition P of the vot-
ers into districts where a favorite alternative of the
briber wins the election, constructing that partition
P from the existing partition Q may require chang-
ing the district of too many voters which makes P
infeasible. Also the effort/cost required for mov-
ing a voter from one district to another may de-
pend on the voter and the pair of districts involved.
For some voters, it may be infeasible to change her
current district. We incorporate these requirements
into four computational problems and provide an
extensive complexity landscape of these problems.
Contribution
In our most general problem, called GERRYMAN-
DERING BRIBERY, we are given a partition P of the
voters, a graph G on the voters, a cost function π
which specifies the cost of moving any voter from
a district to another, a favorite alternative c of the
briber, and a budget B for the briber. The briber
needs to compute if there exists another partition
Q of voters into connected districts which is budget
feasible and makes c a plurality winner in the max-
imum number of districts. We show that the GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY problem is NP-complete even
if we have only 2 alternatives and the graph on the
voters is bipartite [Corollary 2]. However, if the
graph on the voters happens to be a tree and the
number of districts is only some constant, then we
show that there exists a polynomial time algorithm
for the GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY problem [Theo-
rem 6].
Motivated by the concept of reverse gerryman-
dering, we define and study the REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY problem which is the same
as the GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY problem except
there is no graph on the voters and consequently
the is no requirement for districts to be connected.
It seems that existence of a graph on the voters
may not be the main reason for GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY to be intractable since we show that the
REVERSE GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY problem too
is NP-complete even if we have only 2 alternatives.
We study both the GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY
and REVERSE GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY problem
under the assumption that the cost of every trans-
fer is the same (1 without loss of generality). We
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call these problems MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING
and MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING respec-
tively. These two problems also capture the robust-
ness of a partition. A partition is be called robust
if many voters need to change their current district
to change the winner of the election. We show that
the MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING prob-
lems is NP-complete in general [Theorem 2] but
polynomial time solvable if either briber’s budget
is a constant [Corollary 3] or the number of dis-
tricts is a constant [Theorem 7] or we have a con-
stant number of alternatives [Theorem 8]. On the
other hand, the MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING prob-
lem turns out to be much harder: it is NP-complete
even if we have only 2 alternatives and 2 dis-
tricts [Theorem 3]. We also show MINIMUM GER-
RYMANDERING is NP-complete even if the graph is
a tree [Theorem 4]. We summarize our contribu-
tion in this paper in Figure 1.
Related Work
Bartholdi et al. (Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick 1989)
are the first to study, among other election con-
trol, the computational problem of making a
favorite candidate win by partitioning the voters
into two districts. Subsequently, Hemaspaandra et
al. (Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe 2007)
studied extensively both the constructive and de-
structive version of this problem under two tie
breaking rule — tie promoting (TP) and tie elimi-
nating (TE). Lewenberg et al. introduced the gerry-
mandering problem and showed that gerrymander-
ing is NP-complete for election systems where vot-
ers in each district first elect a representative and
the elected representatives ultimately choose an
winner (Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein 2017).
Cohen-Zemach et al. showed that gerrymandering
is NP-complete for district based election sys-
tem (Cohen-Zemach, Lewenberg, and Rosenschein 2018).
Ito et al. extensively studied algorithmic as-
pects of gerrymandering for different graph
classes (Ito et al. 2019). Lev and Lewenberg
studied iterated dynamics which reach to stable
equilibrium in the context of reverse gerrymander-
ing where voters change their districts driven by
their self interest. Bribery is another well studied
election control problem where an external agent,
called briber, pays the voters to change/misreport
their preference so that a preferred alternative of
the briber wins the election. Depending on pricing
model of the voters, various notions of bribery
have been studied. Prominent models among
these variants of bribery include $bribery, shift
bribery (Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra 2006;
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra 2009;
Faliszewski 2008), swap
bribery (Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko 2009),
etc. We refer to (Faliszewski and Rothe 2016) for
an excellent overview of various bribery problems
studied in computational social choice.
Preliminaries and Problem Definitions
Voting Setting
Let us denote the set {1, 2, . . . ,n} by [n] for any
positive integer n. Let A = {a1,a2, . . . ,am} be a
set of alternatives and V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} a set
of voters. If not mentioned otherwise, we denote
the set of alternatives by A, the set of voters by V,
the number of alternatives by m, and the number
of voters by n. Every voter vi has a preference or
vote ≻i which is a complete order over A. We de-
note the set of complete orders over A by L(A).
We call a tuple of n preferences (≻1,≻2, · · · ,≻n
) ∈ L(A)n an n-voter preference profile. For a pref-
erence ≻∈ L(A) and an integer k, we denote the
profile consisting of k copies of ≻ by ≻k. A map
r : ∪n,|C|∈N+L(C)
n
−→ 2C \ {∅} is called a voting
rule. One of the simplest and widely used voting
rule is the plurality voting rule where the set of
winners are the set of those alternatives who ap-
pear at the first position of the maximum number
of voters’ preferences. In the context of plurality
voting rule, we say a voter votes for an alternative
x if the alternative x is the most preferred alterna-
tive of that voter.
In this paper, we consider district based plurality
elections only. In this setting, the set V of voters are
partitioned into k districts as (Pi)i∈[k]. LetWi ⊆ A
be the set of winners from the i-th district Pi ac-
cording to plurality voting rule. The set W of win-
ners of the election is the set of those alternatives
which is a winner from the maximum number of
districts. An alternative x ∈ A is said to be a unique
winner of the election if W = {x}.
Problem Definition
We now define our problems formally.
Problem Definition 1 (GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY). Given a set A of m alternatives, a
set V of n voters, a graph G on V, a preference profile
P of V partitioned into k districts as (Pi)i∈[k], cost
functions π : V × [k] −→ R+ specifying cost of mov-
ing individual voters to various districts, the briber’s
budget B, and an alternative c, compute if it is
possible for the briber to construct another partition
Q = (Qi)i∈[k] by spending at most B so that (i)
G[Qi] is connected and (ii) c is the unique plurality
winner in the election ∪i∈[k]Wi where Wi is the set
of plurality winners in the i-th districtQi. We denote
an arbitrary instance of GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY
by
(
A,V,G, (Pi)i∈[k],π,B, c
)
.
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In Problem Definition 1, the briber wishes that
her favorite alternative c wins uniquely in a major-
ity of the districts. Alternatively, the briber could
as well wish that c at least co-wins in a major-
ity of the districts. It turns out that all our results
(both hardness and algorithmic) extend easily to
the co-winner setting. For ease of exposition, we
consider only the unique winner setting (as defined
in our problem definitions) here. We next define
the MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING problem which is
the GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY problem with the
restriction that the cost of every transfer is the same
(that is, the function π is a constant function 1).
Problem Definition 2 (MINIMUM GERRYMANDER-
ING). Given a set A of m alternatives, a set V of n
voters, a graph G on V, a preference profile P of V
partitioned into k districts as (Pi)i∈[k], the briber’s
budget B, and an alternative c, compute if it is pos-
sible for the briber to construct another partition
Q = (Qi)i∈[k] by moving at most B voters so that (i)
G[Qi] is connected and (ii) c is the unique plurality
winner in the election ∪i∈[k]Wi where Wi is the set
of plurality winners in the i-th districtQi. We denote
an arbitrary instance of GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY
by
(
A,V,G, (Pi)i∈[k],π,B, c
)
.
We next define the REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY problem which is the same as the GER-
RYMANDERING BRIBERY problem except there is no
underlying graph over the voters and thus the dis-
tricts need not to be connected.
Problem Definition 3 (REVERSE GERRYMANDER-
ING BRIBERY). Given a set A of m alternatives, a
preference profile P of a set V of n voters parti-
tioned into k districts as (Pi)i∈[k], cost functions
π : V× [k] −→ R+ specifying cost of moving individ-
ual voters to various districts, the briber’s budget B,
and an alternative c, compute if it is possible for the
briber to construct another partition Q = (Qi)i∈[k]
by spending at most B so that c is the unique plu-
rality winner in the election ∪i∈[k]Wi where Wi is
the set of plurality winners in the i-th district Qi.
We denote an arbitrary instance of REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY by
(
A, (Pi)i∈[k],π,B, c
)
.
We next define the MINIMUM REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING problem which is the REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY problem with the restriction
that the cost of every transfer is the same (that is,
the function π is a constant function 1).
Problem Definition 4 (MINIMUM REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING). Given a setA ofm alternatives, a pref-
erence profile P of a set V of n voters partitioned into
k districts as (Pi)i∈[k], the briber’s budget B, and an
alternative c, compute if it is possible to construct
another partition Q = (Qi)i∈[k] by moving at most
B voters so that c is the unique plurality winner in
the election ∪i∈[k]Wi whereWi is the set of plurality
winners in the i-th district. We denote an arbitrary
instance of MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
by
(
A, (Pi)i∈[k],B, c
)
.
In Proposition 1, we establish complexity theo-
retic connections among the above problems. In the
interest of space, we omit proof of some of our re-
sults (they are marked as ∗).
Proposition 1. We have the following complexity
theoretic relationship among our problems: (i) RE-
VERSE GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY reduces to GER-
RYMANDERING BRIBERY, (ii) MINIMUM REVERSE
GERRYMANDERING reduces to REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING BRIBERY, (iii) MINIMUM REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING reduces to MINIMUM GERRYMANDER-
ING, (iv) MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING reduces to
GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY.
Proof. (i) Given an instance of REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY, define the correspond-
ing instance of GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY
with the same set of alternatives, partition,
cost function, briber’s budget, and favorite al-
ternative as the REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY instance and the graph on voters is
defined to be a complete graph. The equiva-
lence of two instances is immediate.
(ii) Given an instance of MINIMUM REVERSE
GERRYMANDERING, define the correspond-
ing instance of REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY with the same set of alternatives,
partition, briber’s budget, and favorite al-
ternative as the REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY instance and the cost any transfer is
defined to be 1. The equivalence of two in-
stances is immediate.
(iii) Given an instance of MINIMUM REVERSE GER-
RYMANDERING, define the corresponding in-
stance of MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING with
the same set of alternatives, partition, cost
function, briber’s budget, and favorite alter-
native as the MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING instance and the graph on voters is
defined to be a complete graph. The equiva-
lence of two instances is immediate.
(iv) Given an instance of MINIMUM GERRYMAN-
DERING, define the corresponding instance of
GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY with the same set
of alternatives, partition, briber’s budget, and
favorite alternative as the GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY instance and the cost any transfer is
defined to be 1. The equivalence of two in-
stances is immediate.
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Results: Algorithmic Hardness
We present our intractability results in this section.
We begin with showing that the REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY problem is NP-complete even
if we have only 2 alternatives. For that, we re-
duce from the X3C problem which is well known
to be NP-complete (see (Garey and Johnson 1979)
for example). The X3C problem is defined as fol-
lows.
Problem Definition 5 (X3C). Given a universe U =
{ui : i ∈ [3n]} and a collection S = {Sj : j ∈ [m]} of
subsets ofU each of cardinality 3, compute if there ex-
ists a sub-collection T ⊆ S of S such that (i) ∪S∈TS =
U and (ii) |T| = n. We denote an arbitrary instance
of X3C by (U = {ui : i ∈ [3n]} , S = {Sj : j ∈ [m]}).
Theorem 1. The REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY problem is NP-complete even if we have only
2 alternatives.
Proof. The REVERSE GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY
problem clearly belongs to NP. To prove its NP-
hardness, we reduce from the X3C problem. Let
(U = {ui : i ∈ [3n]} , S = {Sj : j ∈ [m]}) be an arbi-
trary instance of X3C. Without loss of generality,
we assume that 5n > m + 1; if not, then we keep
adding 3 new elements in U and a set consisting
of these 3 new elements in S until 5n becomes
more than m + 1. We consider the following in-
stance (A,P,π,B, c) of REVERSE GERRYMANDER-
ING BRIBERY.
A = {c,y}
P =
(
(Vu)u∈U, (VS)S∈S, (Di)i∈[5n−m−1]
)
∀u ∈ U,Vu : {3 votes: c ≻ y
1 vote: y ≻ c}
∀S ∈ S,VS : {1 vote: c ≻ y
3 votes: y ≻ c}
∀i ∈ [5n −m − 1],Di : {1 vote: c ≻ y
2 votes: y ≻ c}
We define the cost function π. For u ∈ U, let
vu ∈ Vu be a voter in the district who votes for
the alternative c. We define the cost of moving the
voter vu to the district VS, S ∈ S, as 1 if u ∈ S.
The cost of any other movement of voters is ∞.
Finally we define B = 3n. This finishes the descrip-
tion of the reduced instance. We claim that the two
instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the X3C in-
stance is a YES instance. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that {Si : i ∈ [n]} forms an exact
set cover of U (by renaming). For every u ∈ U and
i ∈ [n], if u ∈ Si, then we move the voter vu to
the district VSi . We see that the alternative c wins
uniquely in m − n districts in the set {VS : S ∈ S}
and every district in the set {Vu : u ∈ U}. Hence the
alternative c wins uniquely in 4n districts among
8n − 1 districts and thus the REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING BRIBERY instance is also a YES instance.
In the other direction, let the REVERSE GERRY-
MANDERING BRIBERY instance is a YES instance. Let
Q =
(
(V′u)u∈U, (V
′
S)S∈S, (D
′
i)i∈[5n−m−1]
)
be a par-
tition of the voters into 8n−1 districts such that (i)
Q can be obtained from P by spending at most B
according to the cost function π, and (ii) the alter-
native cwins the election uniquely. We first observe
that no voter can be moved to or moved from the
district Di for every i ∈ [5n − m − 1] as the cost
of any such movement is ∞. So, the alternative y
wins in the district D′i for every i ∈ [5n −m − 1].
Therefore, for the alternative c to win the election
uniquely, c must win uniquely in at least n dis-
tricts among the districts in {V′S : S ∈ S}. We ob-
serve that, for the alternative c to win uniquely
in any district in {V′S : S ∈ S}, at least 3 vot-
ers whose preference is c ≻ y must move to that
district; these voters can only come from the dis-
tricts in {Vu : u ∈ U} and there are only 3n such
voters who can be moved. Hence, there can be
at most (and thus exactly) n districts among the
districts in {V′S : S ∈ S} where the alternative c
wins uniquely in the partition Q. We claim that
W = {S ∈ S : c wins uniquely in V′S} ⊆ S forms
an exact set cover of U; we have already argued
that |W| = n. Suppose W does not form an exact
set cover for U, then there exists an element z ∈ U
which W does not cover. Since no voter from the
district Vz have moved, we have |W| < n which is
a contradiction. Hence the X3C instance is also a
YES instance.
In the proof of Theorem 1, the cost of the move-
ments are extremely non-uniform – the cost of any
movement is either 1 or ∞. We next show that
the problem remains NP-complete even if all the
movements have the same cost (which is the MIN-
IMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING problem). How-
ever, we need to make the number of alternatives
unbounded unlike Theorem 1 where the number of
alternatives was 2. We again reduce from the X3C
problem to prove this result.
Theorem 2. The MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING problem is NP-complete.
Proof. The MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
problem clearly belongs to NP. To prove its NP-
hardness, we reduce from X3C. Let (U = {ui :
i ∈ [3n]}, S = {Sj : j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary in-
stance of X3C. We consider the following instance
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(A,P,B, c) of MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDER-
ING. Let λ be any positive integer.
A = {au : u ∈ U} ∪ {c}
P =
(
(PS)S∈S,PC, (Pu,i)u∈U,i∈[m−1]
)
∀S ∈ S,PS : λ copies of au ≻ · · · , ∀u ∈ S,
λ copies of c ≻ · · · λ
PC : m− n + 2 copies of c ≻ . . .
∀u ∈ U, i ∈ [m − 1],Pu,i : m− n+ 2 copies of au ≻ · · ·
B =m − n
We claim that the X3C instance is equivalent to the
MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING instance.
In one direction, let us assume that the X3C in-
stance is a YES instance. Let W ⊆ S forms an exact
set cover for U. Then we move one voter from the
district PC to the district PS for every S ∈ S \ W.
We see that, in the resulting partition, the alterna-
tive c wins in m + 1 districts where as every other
alternative wins in exactly m districts. This makes
c the unique winner in the resulting election. Thus
the MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING instance
is a YES instance.
On the other direction, let the MINIMUM RE-
VERSE GERRYMANDERING instance is a YES instance.
Let Q =
(
(P′S)S∈S,P
′
C, (P
′
u,i)u∈U,i∈[m−1]
)
be a new
partition of the voters such that (i) Q can be ob-
tained from P by moving at most B voters, and (ii)
the alternative c wins the election uniquely. We ob-
serve that, for every district in PC∪{Pu,i : u ∈ U, i ∈
[m−1]}, one needs to remove/add at leastm−n+2
votes in order to change the current set of winners.
Since the budget B is m − n, it follows that the
winners of these districts do not change even af-
ter transferring B voters. The alternative c can win
from at mostm+1 districts – the district PC and the
districts in {PS : S ∈ S}. Hence for c to win uniquely,
every alternative au,u ∈ U, should win from at
most m districts – the alternative au already wins
in every district in {Pu,i : i ∈ [m− 1]}. Let us define
X = {S ∈ S : ∃u ∈ S,au does not win in P
′
S}. Since
B = m − n, it follows that |X| 6 m − n. We claim
that W = S \ X forms an exact set cover for U. We
have |W| = |S|− |X| > n. However, if |W| > n, then
there exists an element u ∈ U such that u belongs
to at least 2 sets in W and thus the alternative au
wins in at least 2 districts in {P′S : S ∈ S} — this
contradicts our assumption that c wins uniquely in
Q. Hence we have |W| = n. We claim that W forms
an exact set cover for U. If not then, there exists
an element v ∈ U such that u belongs to at least
2 sets in W and thus the alternative av wins in at
least 2 districts in {P′S : S ∈ S} — this contradicts
our assumption that c wins uniquely in Q. Hence
W forms an exact set cover for U and thus the X3C
instance is a YES instance.
Due to Proposition 1, we immediately conclude
from Theorem 2 that the MINIMUM GERRYMANDER-
ING problem is also NP-complete. However, we will
show a much stronger result — the MINIMUM GER-
RYMANDERING problem is NP-complete even if we
have only 2 alternatives and 2 districts. To prove
this result, we reduce from the 2-DISJOINT CON-
NECTED PARTITIONING problem.
Definition 1 (2-DISJOINT CONNECTED PARTITION-
ING). Given a connected graph G = (V,E) and
two disjoint nonempty sets Z1,Z2 ⊂ V, compute if
there exists a partition (V1,V2) of V such that (i)
Z1 ⊆ V1,Z2 ⊆ V2, and (ii) G[V1] and G[V2] are
both connected. We denote an arbitrary instance of 2-
DISJOINT CONNECTED PARTITIONING by (G,Z1,Z2).
It is already known that the 2-DISJOINT
CONNECTED PARTITIONING problem is NP-
complete (van ’t Hof, Paulusma, and Woeginger 2009,
Theorem 1).
Theorem 3. The MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING
problem is NP-complete even if we simultaneously
have only 2 alternatives and 2 districts.
Proof. The MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING problem
clearly belongs to NP. To prove its NP-hardness,
we reduce from the 2-DISJOINT CONNECTED PAR-
TITIONING problem. Let (G′ = (U,E′),Z1,Z2) be an
arbitrary instance of 2-DISJOINT CONNECTED PAR-
TITIONING. Let z1 and z2 be any arbitrary (fixed)
vertices of Z1 and Z2 respectively. We consider
the following instance (A,G,P = (H1,H2) ,B, c) of
MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING.
A = {c,y}
V = {vz : z ∈ Z1 ∪ Z2}
∪ {vu,wu : u ∈ V \ (Z1 ∪ Z2)} ∪D ∪D
′,
D = {di : i ∈ [10n + |Z2|]} ,
D′ = {d′i : i ∈ [10n + |Z1|+ 1]}
E = {{va, vb} : {a,b} ∈ E
′}
∪ {{vu,wu} : u ∈ V \ (Z1 ∪ Z2)}
∪ {{di,dj} : i, j ∈ [|Z2|] , j = i+ 1} ∪ {{z2,d1}}
∪ {{d′i,d
′
j} : i, j ∈ [2n + |Z1|+ 1] , j = i + 1}
∪ {{z1,d
′
1}}
H2 = {di : i ∈ [|Z2|]}
H1 = V \ H2
Vote of vu,u ∈ Z2 : c ≻ y
Vote of vu,u ∈ V \ Z2 : y ≻ c
Vote of wu,u ∈ V \ (Z1 ∪ Z2) : c ≻ y
Vote of di, i ∈ [5n] : y ≻ c
Vote of di, 5n < i 6 10n+ |Z2| : c ≻ y
Vote of d′i, i ∈ [5n] : y ≻ c
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Vote of d′i, 5n < i 6 10n + |Z1|+ 1 : c ≻ y
B = 2n
We claim that the 2-DISJOINT CONNECTED PAR-
TITIONING instance is equivalent to the MINIMUM
GERRYMANDERING instance.
In one direction, let us assume that the 2-
DISJOINT CONNECTED PARTITIONING instance is a
YES instance. Let (V1,V2) be a partition of U such
that Z1 ⊆ V1,Z2 ⊆ V2,G
′[V1] and G
′[V2] are both
connected. We consider the following new partition
of the voters.
Voters of H′2 : {vu,wu : u ∈ V2 \ Z2}
∪ {vu : u ∈ Z2} ∪D
′
voters of H′1 : others
Since G′[V′1], G[D
′] is connected, and {z1,d
′
1} ∈ E[G]
is connected, it follows that G[H′1] is also con-
nected. Similarly, since G′[V′2], G[D] is connected,
and {z2,d1} ∈ E[G] is connected, it follows that
G[H′2] is also connected. Thus the MINIMUM GER-
RYMANDERING instance is also a YES instance.
In the other direction, let us assume that the
MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING instance is a YES in-
stance. Let (H′1,H
′
2) be a new partition formed
from (H1,H2) by moving at most B (= 2n) vot-
ers such that the alternative c is the unique winner
in the new election and each new district remains
connected. For the alternative c to win the election
uniquely, cmust at least co-win in bothH′1 andH
′
2.
Since every voter d′i, i ∈ [n] vote for y,B = 2n, and
the alternative c at least co-wins in D′, it follows
that D′ ⊆ H′1. We claim that every voter vu,u ∈ Z1
must belong to H′1 since otherwise c will not be a
co-winner in H′2. Also every voter vu,u ∈ Z2 must
belong to H′2 since otherwise c will not be a co-
winner inH′2. Let us define V1 = {u ∈ G
′ : vu ∈ H
′
1}
and V2 = {u ∈ G
′ : vu ∈ H
′
2}. Since H
′
1 and H
′
2
are both connected, it follows that V1 and V2 are
both connected. Since (V1,V2) forms a partition of
G′, Zi ⊂ V1,Z2 ⊂ V2, it follows that the 2-DISJOINT
CONNECTED PARTITIONING instance is also a YES in-
stance.
Theorem 3 immediately gives us the following.
Corollary 1. The GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY prob-
lem is NP-complete even if we simultaneously have
only 2 alternatives and 2 districts.
The graph on the voters in the proof of Theo-
rem 3 can be arbitrarily complex. A natural ques-
tion would be what is the complexity of the MIN-
IMUM GERRYMANDERING problem for simple graph
classes. We show next that MINIMUM GERRYMAN-
DERING problem is NP-complete even if the graph
on the set of voters is a tree.
Theorem 4. The MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING
problem is NP-complete even if the underlying graph
is a tree.
Proof. The MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING problem
clearly belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness we re-
duce from X3C. Let (U = {ui : i ∈ [3n]}, S = {Sj :
j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary instance of X3C. We con-
sider the following instance (A,G,P,B, c) of MINI-
MUM GERRYMANDERING. For an element u ∈ U, let
fu be the number of sets in S which contains u.
A = {au : u ∈ U} ∪ {c}
P = ((XS)S∈S, (Yu,i)u∈U,i∈[m−fu])
∀S ∈ S,XS : 10n copies each of c ≻ · · · ,au ≻ · · · ,u ∈ S
∀u ∈ U, i ∈ [m − fu], Yu,i : 10n copies of au ≻ · · ·
B = 7n
In the graph G on the voters, the induced graph
on each district XS, S ∈ S, Yu,i,u ∈ U, i ∈
[m − fu] forms a path. Also the induced graph on
∪u∈U ∪
m−fu
i=1 Yu,i forms a path; one end point of
this path be a district Y1w,1 for some w ∈ U with
the end vertex (voter) be Y1w,1. In every district
XS, S = {x,y, z} ∈ S, at one end point of the path,
call X1S, the voter X
1
S vote for c and the other 6 ver-
tices (voters) closest to X1S in the district XS respec-
tively for ax,ax,ay,ay,az, and az respectively. We
observe that G is a tree. We now claim that the two
instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the X3C in-
stance is a YES instance. Let W ⊆ S, |W| = n forms
an exact cover for U. For every S ∈ W, we move 7
voters from the district X1S to the district Yw,1; recall
that 2 of these 7 voters in X1S at the boundary with
Yw,1 vote for ax for x ∈ S and one voter from these
7 voters vote for c. We observe that, in the resulting
district XS, S ∈ W, the alternative c wins uniquely.
Since W forms an exact cover for U, it follows that
every alternative au,u ∈ U wins in m − 1 districts
whereas cwins inm districts. Hence c is the unique
winner of the resulting district. Since |W| = n, we
have moved 7n(= B) voters. Hence the MINIMUM
GERRYMANDERING instance is a YES instance.
In other direction, let us assume that
the MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING instance
is a YES instance. Let the new districts be
P′ = ((X′S)S∈S, (Y
′
u,i)u∈U,i∈[m−fu]) where the
alternative c wins uniquely. Since B = 7n and we
need to move at least 10n voters to change the
winner of any district in {Yu,i : u ∈ U, i ∈ [m− fu]},
the winner of Yu,i is the same as Y
′
u,i for ev-
ery u ∈ U, i ∈ [m − fu]. Hence c wins in
at most m districts, namely the districts in
{X′S : S ∈ S}. We define W ⊆ S as follows:
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W = {S ∈ S : the voter X1S belong to Yw,1′}. We
observe that |W| = n and W forms a set cover
for U. Suppose not, then there exists an element
u ∈ U such that the alternative au co-wins in fu
districts among {X′S : S ∈ S}. Hence the alternative
au wins in m districts in P
′. This contradicts our
assumption that c wins uniquely in P′. Hence the
X3C instance is a YES instance.
Theorem 4 immediately gives us the following
corollary because of Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. The GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY prob-
lem is NP-complete even if the underlying graph is a
tree.
Results: Algorithms
We now exhibit few situations where some of our
problems admit polynomial time algorithms. We
begin with showing that the MINIMUM GERRYMAN-
DERING problem is polynomial time solvable if the
budget B is a constant.
Theorem 5. The MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING
problem is polynomial time solvable if the budget B
is a constant.
Proof. We guess the b voters who leave their cur-
rent district. We also guess the new district of each
of the voters that move. For each guess, we check
whether (i) the new districts are connected and (ii)
the preferred alternative c wins which can clearly
be done in polynomial time. Since there are only
O((nk)b) such guesses, our algorithm runs in poly-
nomial time when b is some constant.
Theorem 5 immediately implies polynomial time
algorithm for the MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING problem under same setting.
Corollary 3. The MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING problem is polynomial time solvable if the
budget B is a constant.
We next show that there is a polynomial time al-
gorithm for the GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY prob-
lem if we the number of districts is some constant
and the graph on the voters happen to be a tree.
The intuitive reason for having such an algorithm
is that, for trees, any solution of GERRYMANDERING
BRIBERY can be expressed as a set of ℓ edges that
cuts the districts.
Theorem 6. The GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY prob-
lem is polynomial time solvable for trees if the num-
ber of districts is a constant.
Proof. Let (A,V,G,P,π,B, c) be an arbitrary in-
stance of GERRYMANDERING BRIBERY where the
graph G is a tree. Let d be the number of districts
which is assumed to be some constant. We observe
that, since G is a tree, there exists exactly d cut
edges with respect to the partition P— edges with
end points on different districts. Also, the number
of edges in G is n − 1 since G is a tree. Hence, the
number of partition of V into d connected districts
is only O((n − 1)d) which is nO(1) since d is a con-
stant. For every partition, we check if (i) c wins
the resulting election uniquely, and (ii) the total
cost of all the transfers is at most B (both can be
done in polynomial time). If we can find such a
partition where both the above conditions hold, we
output YES, otherwise we output NO. Clearly, when
the algorithm outputs YES, it discovers a partition
which can be obtained by spending at most B and
makes c win the election uniquely. On the other
hand, when the algorithm outputs NO, we know
that there does not exist any partition which sat-
isfies both the above requirement. Hence the algo-
rithm is correct.
Theorem 6 immediately implies a polynomial
time algorithm for the MINIMUM GERRYMANDER-
ING problem in the same setting.
Corollary 4. The MINIMUM GERRYMANDERING
problem is polynomial time solvable for trees if the
number of districts is a constant.
We now show that the REVERSE GERRYMANDER-
ING BRIBERY problem is polynomial time solvable if
the number of districts is a constant.
Theorem 7. The MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMAN-
DERING problem is polynomial time solvable if the
number of districts is a constant.
Proof. Let (A,P = (Pi)i∈[ℓ],B, c) be any instance of
MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING. We present
an algorithm check if there exists a partition Q =
(Qi)i∈[ℓ] of voters where the alternative c wins
uniquely and it can be obtained from P by transfer-
ring at most B voters. Let d be the number of dis-
tricts which is assumed to be a constant. We guess
the plurality score wi, i ∈ [ℓ], of a winner in every
district; there are O(nd) such possibilities. We also
guess the subset I ⊆ [ℓ] of districts where c is a win-
ner; again there are O(2d) such possibilities. Sup-
pose |I| = λ For these guesses, we execute the fol-
lowing steps. Throughout the steps below, we will
decrease B sometimes; if B becomes negative any-
time, then we discard this guess of wi, i ∈ [ℓ], and
I.
1. We initialize a set R to empty set.
2. For every alternative x ∈ A \ {c} and district
i ∈ [ℓ], if the plurality score p(x; i) of x in the
district i is strictly more than wi, then move
p(x; i) − wi voters who vote for the alternative
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x and having smallest costs from the district i to
R and decrease B by p(x; i) − wi. Throughout
the algorithm we will decrease B sometimes; if
B becomes negative anytime, then we discard
this guess of wi, i ∈ [ℓ], and I. For every dis-
trict i ∈ I, if the plurality score p(c; i) of c in
the district i is strictly more than wi, then move
p(c; i) −wi voters who vote for the alternative c
and having smallest costs from the district i to R
and decrease B by p(c; i) −wi. For every district
i ∈ [ℓ] \ I, if the plurality score p(c; i) of c in the
district i is more than or equal to wi, then move
p(c; i) − wi + 1 voters who vote for the alterna-
tive cand having smallest costs from the district
i to R and decrease B by p(c; i) − wi + 1. After
this step is executed for every alternative x ∈ A
and district i ∈ [ℓ], the plurality score of any al-
ternative x ∈ A in any district i ∈ [ℓ] is at most
wi.
3. We run this step as long as we can. For every dis-
trict i ∈ I, if the plurality score of the alternative
c in the district i is strictly less than wi, then we
do the following:
(a) If there exists a voter in R who vote for c, then
we move that voter from R to the district i.
(b) Else if there exists a district j ∈ [ℓ]\I which has
a voter voting for c, then we move that voter
voting for c and having smallest cost among
all voters voting for c in the set [ℓ] \ I of dis-
tricts from its current district to district i and
decrease B by 1.
(c) Else we discard our current guess.
4. We run this step as long as we can. For every al-
ternative x ∈ R and district i ∈ [ℓ], if the plurality
score p(x; i) of x in the district i is at mostwi−2,
then we move one voter voting for x from R to
the district i.
5. If R contains any voter voting for c, then we dis-
card our current guess (in this case,
∑
i∈Iwi +∑
i∈[ℓ]\I(wi − 1) is strictly less than the sum of
plurality scores of c in all districts).
6. We run this step until R is non-empty: for every
voter v in R voting for some alternative x ∈ A
and district i ∈ [ℓ], if the plurality score p(x; i) of
x in the district i is less than wi, then we move
v to the district i. If for some voter v, there does
not exist any such district i, then we discard our
current guess.
7. Now R is an empty set. For every alternative x ∈
A \ {c}, if x is a co-winner in at least λ (recall
λ is the guessed number of districts where c has
highest plurality score) districts, let v be a voter
voting for the alternative x and having smallest
cost among all the voters voting for x in all the
districts where x has the highest plurality score.
Let j ∈ [ℓ] be a district such that the plurality
score of x in district j is at most wj− 2. We move
the voter v from his current district to district j
and decrease R by 1. If no such district j exists,
then we discard our current guess.
If there exists a guess which is not discarded by
any of the above steps, then the algorithm out-
puts YES. If all possible guesses are discarded by
the above steps, then the algorithm outputs NO. If
the algorithm outputs YES, it indeed constructs an-
other partition of voters from the given partition
by moving at most B voters where c is the unique
winner in the overall election. On the other hand,
if the algorithm discards a guess, indeed there does
not exist any partition which respects the guess and
can be obtained from the given partition by mov-
ing at most B voters where c wins. Hence, if every
possible guess is discarded by some of the above
steps, then the instance is indeed a NO instance.
This concludes the correctness of the algorithm.
Since all the above steps can be executed in poly-
nomial time, it follows that our algorithm runs is
polynomial time if we have a constant number of
districts.
Theorem 8. There exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm for theMINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
problem if the number of alternatives is some con-
stant.
Proof. Let (A,P = (Pi)i∈[ℓ],B, c) be any in-
stance of MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING.
We present a dynamic programming based algo-
rithm for a generalization of the MINIMUM RE-
VERSE GERRYMANDERING problem (strictly speak-
ing, our new problem is not a generalization of
MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING but it will be
obvious that MINIMUM REVERSE GERRYMANDERING
polynomial time Turing reduces to our new prob-
lem for m = O(1) as we explain later). In our
new problem, other than the input of MINIMUM RE-
VERSE GERRYMANDERING, we are also given a “sup-
ply vector” (λa)a∈A and a “score vector” (s(a))a∈A
and we call the instance an YES instance if and
only if there is a partition P′ = (P′i)i∈[ℓ] such
that the total number of votes for an alternative
a is the total number of votes for the alternative
a plus λa (λa could be negative also), the total
number of voters left their district from P is at
most the given budget B, and every alternative
a ∈ A wins in s(a) districts in P′. We have a
Boolean dynamic programming table T indexed by
the set of all tuples in {(i, (λa)a∈A,b, (s(a))a∈A) :
i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ},−B 6 λa 6 B ∀a ∈ A,b ∈
{0, . . . ,B}, 0 6 s(a) 6 ℓ ∀a ∈ A}. We define
T(0, (λa)a∈A,b, (s(a))a∈A) to be TRUE if and only
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if λa = 0 ∀a ∈ A,b > 0, s(a) = 0 ∀a ∈ A.
We update the entries of our dynamic program-
ming table as follows. For a vector (µa)a∈A ∈
Z
m, we define f+((µa)a∈A) =
∑
a∈A:µa>0
µa and
f−((µa)a∈A) =
∑
a∈A:µa−0
−µa. Let (γ
i
a)a∈A be
the number of votes that alternative a receives in
district Pi. Lastly, for a vector (νa)a∈A ∈ N
m and
an alternative a ∈ A, we define 1a((νa)a∈A) to be
1 if and only if νa = maxx∈A νx.
T(i, (λa)a∈A,b, (s(a))a∈A) =
∨
(µa)a∈A∈Z
m,µa6νa ∀a∈A
f+((µa)a∈A)6b,f
−((µa)a∈A)6b
T
(
i− 1, (λa + µa)a∈A ,b− f
+
(
(µa)a∈A
)
,(
s(a) − 1a
((
γia + µa
)
a∈A
)))
That is, while we update an entry of our dynamic
programming table with i districts, we guess over
all possible ways district i could change in a so-
lution; it follows from the above update rule that
we need to check O(bm) such guesses. The correct-
ness of our algorithm is immediate from our dy-
namic programming formulation and update rule.
We observe that our dynamic programming table
has O(ℓ(2B)mBℓm) entries and each entry can be
updated in O(bm) time both of which are polyno-
mial in input parameters if m = O(1). Hence our
algorithm runs in polynomial time ifm = O(1).
Conclusion
We have initiated the study of minimum gerry-
mandering where the goal is to minimally change
a given partition of voters into districts so that a
favored alternative wins the election. Our results
show that most of these problems are computa-
tionally intractable even under quite restrictive set-
tings. These results show that district based elec-
tion system is quite robust against against compu-
tationally bounded manipulators. We finally com-
plement our hardness results with exhibiting poly-
nomial time algorithms for some of our problems
in some special cases. Since most of the problems
studied in this paper is NP-complete, it would be
interesting to study approximation and parameter-
ized algorithms for these problems. For example,
many of our problems are polynomial time solvable
if the budget or the number of districts are some
constant. It would be interesting to study parame-
terized complexity of our problems with respect to
these parameters.
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